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Criminal Law-Plea BargainingWithdrawal of Guilty Plea.
Robert Clancy and Lowell Stem, petitioners, were individually
indicted for possession and sale of marijuana (felonious courts in
West Virginia at that time). Their pleas of not guilty were changed
to pleas of guilty based on a belief that the trial court would grant
them probation. Instead prison sentences were handed down; both
defendants moved to withdraw their pleas; but their motions were
denied. Defendants petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The
petition required the court, in an original habeas corpus proceeding,
to make a factual determination of the voluntariness of the guilty
pleas based on affidavits of the parties and transcripts of the proceedings in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County. The two
petitions were joined for argument. Held: writs awarded. The
court, in both cases, determined that the pleas were involuntary and
that the trial judge should have permitted the withdrawal of the
guilty pleas. The court also affirmed the legality of plea bargaining
in criminal trials, stating that the plea agreement should be made a
part of the record. State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, 179 S.E.2d 726
(W. Va. 1971).
The court in Clancy took a strongly subjective approach to
the determination of a voluntary guilty plea. Judge Caplan, in
writing the opinion of the court, stated that a defendant's guilty plea
would be involuntary if entered upon a mistaken belief that a binding
agreement had been made.' It made no difference whether this mistaken belief was induced by the prosecuting attorney, the defense
counsel, or even a misunderstanding solely on the part of the defendant.' Moreover, in discussing record evidence, the court stated
that the statements of the defendant that he was entering the plea
voluntarily, while evidentiary on the issue, would not bar inquiry as
to the voluntariness of the plea.' The court also upheld the legality
of plea bargaining,' citing the administrative necessities for its
State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, 179 S.E.2d 726, 731 (W. Va. 1971).
at 732.
Id. at 733.
4 Completely ignored by the court was the case of Maloney v. Coiner,
152 W. Va. 437, 164 S.E.2d 205 (1968). The prosecutor in that case
negotiated a guilty plea in return for a plea to a lesser charge and an agreement only to include one previous offense in the information to be filed with
the court (the defendant wished to avoid West Virginia's Recidivist Statute).
The court allowed the plea to stand, thus impliedly upholding the legality of
plea bargaining.
2
Id.
3
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existence.' However, to insure an adequate determination of whether
a plea was voluntarily entered, the court added that the plea agreement should be made a part of the record.6
The guilty plea has long been a major practice in the adjudication of defendants within the American criminal justice system.7
Its extensive use is due primarily to plea bargaining. In West Virginia,
a survey of county prosecuting attorneys showed that roughly fifty
percent of all guilty pleas are negotiated pleas.' This would probably
be a low estimate. The survey was made a full two years before
Clancy. Prosecuting attorneys would not be inclined to admit to an
extensive use of a practice which had not received express judicial
recognition.
The practice of bargaining for pleas has been both maligned
and supported. A great amount of literature can be found both for
and against the practice.9
I "In this day of crowded criminal court dockets the speedy dispatch
of litigation is essential if justice is to be done." 179 S.E,2d at 733.
6
1d. at 734.
7 Several sources indicate that as many as ninety percent of the defendants
convicted plead guilty. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,
36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968); Hazard, The Sequence of Criminal Prosecution, in NATIONAL SYMPOSiUM ON SCIENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 42 (1966).
Statistics in the federal courts affirm such a high percentage. In eighty-nine
United States District Courts the percentage of the total defendants convicted
and sentenced which were adjudicated by pleas of guilty or nolo contendere
was 85% in 1968. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINIsTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTs table 4 (1968). (This report is
published each year in REPORTS OF THE PROcEEDINGS oF THE JUDIcAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES.)
8
The questionnaire was answered by thirty-one of fifty-five county
prosecuting attorneys in West Virginia. The author of that survey arrived at a
weighted average by comparing the county population with the responses
from those prosecuting attorneys who answered the questionnaire. In this
manner, he determined that 76.8 percent of those convicted and sentenced in
West Virginia were adjudicated by guilty pleas, and that over 46 percent of
those guilty pleas were negotiated. This percentage is probably somewhat
below actual practice because this figure includes three prosecutors who
would not admit to plea negotiation. C. Toon, Plea Bargaining: West Virginia
View and Practice Compared to New National Views (1968) (unpublished
paper presented at a Criminal Procedure Seminar at West Virginia University
College of Law).
9 For complete discussions of the present-day practice of plea bargaining
see D. NEWMAN, CONWCTION: THm DETERMINATION OF GuiLT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); THE PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION ON Law ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:

Trm

COURTS 9

(1967). For a more critical view, see Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 50 (1968). Condemnation of the process has
also been proposed. See note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83
HAnv. L. REv. 1387 (1970).
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However, the court in Clancy did not go into a lengthy discussion
of the legality of the practice of plea bargaining in West Virginia
trial courts. It merely recognized that present-day court congestion
requires prompt disposition of criminal cases to insure that justice is
done."0 Brady v. United States" was relied on by Clancy as the

principal authority for the legality of plea bargaining. Brady had
been indicted for kidnapping in violation of a federal statute. He
originally pleaded not guilty, but changed his plea to guilty after
learning that a co-defendant had confessed and would testify against
him. He entered the plea to avoid the death penalty which by
statute could only be imposed by recommendation of a jury. The
defendant's guilty plea was upheld as a voluntary and proper plea
and relief was denied. The Supreme Court accepted the process of
bargaining for pleas between the defendant and the state. 2 However,
for this bargaining process to be proper, the Court has held that the
plea must withstand the test of whether it was a voluntary and
knowing choice among the alternatives available to the defendant.'"
Therefore, in accepting a guilty plea, a trial judge must be sure that
the defendant's plea is voluntarily and intelligently made.
To insure that the plea meets these requirements, the court in
Clancy further stated that the bargain itself should be made a part
of the record." By requiring that it be open and recorded, the
practice of plea bargaining attains the dignity of a judicial procedure,
and it becomes subject to public scrutiny and appellate review.'"
Though the court stated that plea bargaining should be made a part
of the record,'" it is presumed that this refers to the bargain itself,
10 "In this day of crowded criminal court dockets the speedy dispatch
of litigation is essential if justice is to be done." 179 S.E.2d at 733.
"397 U.S. 742 (1970).
2
1d. at 753.
' This was the interpretation of Brady which the Supreme Court gave
in a later opinion. The test is "whether the plea represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
'4

179 S.E.2d at 734.

5Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1968); Smith v. United
States, 277 F. Supp. 850 (D. Md. 1967). Requiring the inclusion of the
plea bargain in the record appears to be a growing trend. See United States v.
Williams, 407 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1969) (a full and complete disclosure of
the negotiations should be made a part of the record); People v. West, 3 Cal.
3d 253, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409 (1970) (a bargained plea should be
recorded); Hamm v. State, 123 Ga. App. 10, 179 S.E.2d 272 (1970) (plea
bargaining should appear in the record); Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727,
183 N.W.2d 56 (1971) (plea agreement should be made of record).
16

179 S.E.2d at 734.
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and not the bargaining process. The bargain alone would be sufficient
information for review.
The requirement that the bargain be recorded is somewhat different from the proposal made by the American Bar Association. In
its Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, the ABA has recommended
that where a plea agreement has been reached, the judge may make
the agreement part of the record if the parties request that this be
done.' 7 Thus, the recording of the agreement is not only discretionary
with the trial judge, but it must also be requested by both parties. It
should be noted that these standards were presented as minimum
standards. The court in Clancy has merely endorsed a higher standard.
The withdrawal of a guilty plea in West Virginia is allowed
only at the discretion of the trial judge. Depriving the court of this
discretion will come only upon a showing that the defendant entered
his plea under some mistake, misapprehension, promise or inducement which has worked an injustice."8 In the federal courts the
guilty plea may be withdrawn at anytime before the sentence is
imposed. After sentencing, the court may permit the accused to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice,' 9 but this occurs only in
extraordinary cases."0 The court in Clancy accepted the federal view
of allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea even after sentencing. For this
reason, the court permitted the withdrawal of the guilty pleas because
it believed an injustice had occurred.
In deciding whether a plea was entered voluntarily, the court in
Clancy proposed a subjective process called the "totality of circumstances test.""' This test is basically an interpretation of the facts
17 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDADS FOR CRMINAL JUSTICE, STANDAimS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.3 (Tent. Draft 1967) (approved by
ABA House of Delegates, February 1968).
'8 State v. Stevenson, 67 W. Va. 553, 68 S.E. 286 (1910). This point
seems well established in West Virginia: see, e.g., In Re Eplin, 132 W. Va. 610,
53 S.E.2d 614 (1949) (trial court has the discretion to permit withdrawal of
guilty plea).
19"A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may
be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside
the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea."
FED. R. CiuM. P. 32(d). See, e.g., Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204
(4th Cir.
1963); Fogus v. United States, 34 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1929).
20 United States v. Roland, 318 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1963). (court
implied that incompetency to stand trial and understanding fully the nature
of the proceeding by the defendant would be sufficient grounds to come
within the extraordinary case rule).
21 179 S.E.2d at 732.
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surrounding the plea to discern whether the defendant has been misled
into pleading guilty. Thus, any facts which would help to show a
state of mind which might cause an involuntary plea (e.g., fear, distrust, expectation) are to be considered. Such a test however, is difficult for the reviewing court to administer. It is necessarily vague
and open to variations in the interpretation of factual circumstances.
A better understanding of the application of such a test may
be achieved by a discussion of the authority cited by the court in
2 the accused
Clancy. In United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi,"
pleaded guilty to the charge of selling six marijuana cigarettes.
After a long prison sentence was handed down by the trial judge,
his attorney deserted him. The chief law assistant of the county
court subsequently informed him that there was nothing more that
could be done. The defendant asserted, in petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, that the guilty plea was induced by a promise from
his counsel that he would not go to prison. There was enclosed an
uncontested statement by the defendant that his counsel told him that
he would not go to prison. The defendant had also overheard the
assistant prosecuting attorney relate to defense counsel that he
would ask for the maximum penalty if the defendant did not plead
guilty. Following discussion on the effect of the threat, the court
held that an involuntary plea would result if induced by a "coercive"
promise or threat. 3
Another leading case on subjective inquiry discussed by the
court in Clancy is that of United Staies ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan."
In Elksnis, the trial judge promised the defendant a sentence of no
more than ten years in prison, but withdrew this promise at the time
for sentencing. The court expressly found that the judge's promise
had created an unfair influence on the defendant even without the
use of subjective testimony."5 Certainly a judge should not involve
himself in the bargaining process, either directly or indirectly."6
Subjective inquiry was not necessary to the decision in this case.
22 275
23

F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).

Id. at 516.

24 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
23 Id.
at 253.
26

"In view of the concepts of impartiality and fairness which have
traditionally guided the exercise of the judicial function, it is submitted that
encouragement of guilty pleas by sentencing concessions is -more censurable
when practiced by courts than by prosecutors." Note, The Influence of the
Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204,
220 (1956) (footnotes omitted); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (trial judge should not participate in bargaining process).
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The court also cited United States ex rel. McCant v. Brierly2"
In this case the defendant's plea was held to be involuntary. There
was no inquiry by the trial judge as to whether the defendant understood the plea, whether a plea agreement had been made, or if
the defendant understood the consequences of his plea (the defendant
had a third-grade education). Confusion also existed as to the
nature of the plea agreement reached between the defense counsel
and the district attorney. The plea of guilty was entered only twenty
minutes after a plea of not guilty had been given. Considering all of
these circumstances, it is easy to see that substantial doubt existed
as to the voluntariness of the plea.
The subjective test (totality of circumstances) for the voluntariness of a guilty plea can be seen to involve the interplay of different
circumstances upon the defendant's state of mind reflected in the
choice of his plea. In Thurmond, Elksnis, and McCant this involuntariness of action was affirmatively shown by a clear preponderance of the circumstances leading up to the defendant's plea.
In Clancy, the prosecuting attorney made no threats. By affidavit of the defense attorney for Clancy, the plea agreement was a
guilty plea to the first count, possession for sale of marijuana, in the
indictment, in return for dropping the second count, sale of marijuana. The prosecutor would also recommend probation to the
judge and not resist probation2 8 (it is incongruous that one would
promise to recommend probation, and at the same time promise not
to resist probation). Although Clancy's attorneys believed the
granting of probation was "relatively positive" they admitted in their
affidavits that the prosecutor could not guarantee probation. 9 Nonetheless, the court deemed the plea involuntary, finding that the
prosecuting attorney had promised to recommend probation to
the judge for defendant Clancy and did not fulfill that promise.
This would be grounds for withdrawal of the plea even without a
subjective determination of its impact upon the defendant.3" But in
the case of defendant Stern, no such promise appeared in the record.
27 304

F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
179 S.E.2d at 727.
1d. at 729.
30 Hamrick v. Boles, 229 F. Supp. 570, 572 (N.D. W. Va. 1964).
"Prosecutor promises to make a recommendation to the court as to sentence, but
fails to do so. The plea should be set aside as involuntary because induced by
trickery." 8 J.MooRE, FEDERAL PRAMcE g 11.05 [4] (3) (2d ed. 1970).
28
29
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The record showed that he did not plead to one count, but to both.'
The trial judge not only read both counts of the indictment, but also
questioned the defendant concerning the charges. 2 An attorney, by
affidavit, related a conversation between counsel and defendant in
which the defendant stated that he knew that probation was not
guaranteed.3" Again, this plea was considered involuntary by the
court.
The Supreme Court did not seem to go this far in Brady v.
United States. " The defendant need not correctly assess every relevant detail concerning his plea. 5 Nor is the plea invalid when the
7
defendant decides to accept a probability." Even Thurmond"
required that the state of a man's mind (subjective test) be determined on the basis of reasonable inferences from known facts and

circumstances."
The leading test concerning the validity of guilty pleas which
contains both objective and subjective determinations is that written
by Judge Tuttle, dissenting in Shelton v. United States. 9 Judge Tuttle
stated that if a defendant is aware of the consequences of his guilty

plea (e.g., different possibilities of sentencing available) and knows
the value of any promises made to him (e.g., that a probability is not

a guarantee), then his plea is voluntary unless improperly induced by

trickery, threat, or falsity."° All of these items could be discerned in
a candid inquiry by the trial judge.
3, Record, Transcript of Proceedings of October 27, 1969, 40-41, State
v. Stem, joined on appeal and cited as State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, 179
S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1971).
11 1d. Record at 42-45.
33 179 S.E.2d at 731.
34 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
3- "The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not
require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not
correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision." Id. at 757.
-6 Id. at 751.
37
United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.

N.Y. 3 1967).
1Id. at 518.

39242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957).
The complete text of Judge Tuttle's test is as follows:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper
as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.
bribes).
Id. at 115. Judge Tuttle's test received the approval of the court in Shelton v.
United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572, n. 2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on
40
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Testimony in both cases in Clancy demonstrated that neither
defendant felt that probation was guaranteed. " It has been held
that to create an intelligent plea it is not required that all advice
given by a defense attorney withstand inspection at a subsequent
hearing. 2 Nor is a defendant entitled to withdraw a plea because
of an expectation of leniency which was unfulfilled, unless it was
improperly induced by the prosecution." Also, the defendant need
not be informed of the exact sentence which is to be imposed."
The apparent conflict in fact determination between the court
in Clancy and other cases using a subjective test must be resolved by
the difference in the burden of proof required. In Clancy the only
burden which the defendant had to meet was that of creating a "sufficient doubt" as to the voluntariness of the plea." Thus, even though
the facts in defendant Stem's case did not appear to create an involuntary plea, they were questionable enough to create a sufficient
doubt as to whether it was a completely voluntary plea.
The court would seem to have put itself in a rather difficult
position. In this type of situation it is attempting to make a factual
determination solely through the use of affidavits and trial transcript.
It would be hard to decide what the state of a man's mind was without
having heard his testimony and observing his demeanor. It would
seem more appropriate if the court could develop a procedure
whereby a case could be remanded for a complete hearing on the
issue of voluntariness. A special judge could be appointed from an

confession of error on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958). This test was

approved by the Supreme Court in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755
(1970).
41 179 S.E.2d at 729, 731. In the case of defendant Clancy, his counsel
stated in an affidavit that they had cautioned Clancy that they could not
guarantee probation. Defendant Stern stated, in the presence of his counsel
and a visiting attorney, that he was told that probation was not guaranteed.
This statement is contained in an affidavit by the visiting attorney.
42 "That a guilty plea must be intelligently made is not a requirement
that all advice offered by the defendant's lawyer withstand retrospective
examination in a post-conviction hearing." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 770 (1970).
43 United States v. Chinn, 74 F. Supp. 189, 191 (S.D. W. Va. 1947). In
another case, the court would not allow withdrawal of the guilty plea where
the defendant had received a longer sentence than he believed he would
receive. Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21, 264 A.2d 643 (1970).
44 State ex rel. Post v. soles, 147 W.Va. 26, 36, 124 S.E.2d 697, 702
(1962).
45 179 S.E.2d at 731.
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adjoining circuit and could hear testimony on the issue. In this
manner the parties would be before the court and a more complete
and thorough inquiry could be achieved.
.Tam'es Clark Gardill

Criminal Law-Vicarious Liability-Robber Convicted of
Murder when Robbery Victim Killed Accomplice
Daniels and Smith entered a liquor store to commit a robbery.
While holding the managers, Mr. and Mrs. West, at gunpoint, they
repeatedly threatened to kill them if they did not cooperate. Mrs.
West drew a pistol and shot Smith, who later died from his wounds.
Taylor, a third accomplice waiting outside in the getaway car, was
arrested and charged with both robbery and the murder of Smith.
A motion to set aside the murder indictment was denied and Taylor
appealed. Held: Affirmed. Although the petitioner could not be
convicted under the felony-murder rule, he could be found guilty of
murder under the theory of vicarious liability. Taylor v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970).
The court recognized the rule of People v. Washington,' that
a felon could not be held liable under the felony-murder rule for a
killing committed by the victim. However, petitioner's liability was
predicated on a theory enunciated in Washington and People v.
Gilbert2 that one may be held vicariously responsible for a killing
committed by another where the defendant or his accomplice intended
to kill, or with a conscious disregard for life committed acts likely
to result in death. Washington and Gilbert both noted that where
defendants initiate gun battles, such initiation would constitute an

act done in total disregard of life and likely to result in death. The
majority in Taylor found that pointing the gun at the victims and
threatening lethal force if the victims did not cooperate "was sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance to lead a man of ordinary
caution and prudence to conclude that Daniels and Smith 'initiated'
the gun battle, or that such conduct was done with conscious disregard
for human life and with natural consequences dangerous to
13
life."

'62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
3Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 584, 477 P.2d 131, 135, 91
Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 (1970).
2
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